Taxation – Inland Revenue concessions: convenience or just illegal? by Booth, John
made at a smooth text untrammelled by 
gender, below episcopal level.'
Pure Dale, especially the little flick at 
the end. He was a person who, over his 
immensely long, varied and productive 
professional life, defied pigeonholing. He 
liked to be noticed and appreciated, but 
was unaffected in his behaviour and as 
modest in his demands if they touched 
him personally as he was insistent if they 
touched the interests of anyone he had
taken under his wing. He never sought 
position, but over the years the attributes 
of position gravitated towards him: the 
knighthood, the benchership of his Inn, 
the honorary doctorate. After his 90th 
birthday, and in the aftermath of the 
Institute of Advanced Legal StudiesO
including his portrait as the only outsider 
amongst its 50th Anniversary series of 
former directors, I asked him for a 
photograph to hang on my wall in the
Foreign Office, in counter-position to the 
set of FO Legal Advisers; it seemed to 
give him as much pleasure as anything 
else that had happened. It was a privilege 
to have known him and worked with 
him. @
Sir Franklin Herman QC
Taxation
Inland Revenue concessions: convenience or just illegal?
by John Booth
4 John Booth
This article is a review of the anomaly 
of remissions of tax (called 
'concessions'), made on the authority of 
the Commissioners of HM Treasury, and 
shows, from the most recently released 
papers in the Public Record Office, that 
this is widely misunderstood within the 
Treasury and Inland Revenue.
Although this source is restricted by 
the release of papers under the '30-year 
rule', the up-to-date House of Commons 
committee papers fill in much 
information for those missing years. 
However within both sources there is an 
absence of references to court 
judgments, or of comments from learned 
counsel or commentators, all drawing 
attention to many anomalies.
There is also the problem for 
appellants of the absence of any statutory 
appeals procedure from this 'secondary 
legislation', or of the need for the costs of 
appeals to be borne, for defendants and 
appellants alike, on a 'level playing field'.
It is hoped that these comments will help 
to extend this debate.
THE COMMISSIONERS OF 
HM TREASURY
What is meant by HM Treasury and 
what is the authority for its powers over 
the Inland Revenue department?
The statutory source is still of their 
'authority, direction and control' (Inland 
Revenue Regulation Act 1890 (IRRA), s. 
1(2)) over the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue. It is this statute which 
distinguishes the Revenue from other 
departments that also practice 'extra- 
statutory concessions', the significance 
being that the Revenue department is 
that of taxation and specifically of any 
dispensing power which was ended by 
the Bill of Rights 1688:
'that levying MoneyJor or to the use of the 
Crown, by Pretence of Prerogative, without 
Grant of Parliament ... is illegal' (Bill of 
Rights Act 1688, s. 1(4)).
It is of interest that only one reference 
was found to that Statute in Treasury 
papers up to 1960, but a note to the 
Home Office confirmed that:
'It is doubtful whether there is any authority 
under which the Treasury can grant an extra- 
statutory concession ... the Bill of Rights put 
an end to the Crown's dispensing power'. 
(PRO T233, F.I544, 27 April 1945)
This note also drew attention to the 
1897 Report of the Committee of Public
Accounts (hereafter 'CPA') and the 
Treasury Minute of 31 December 1897 
(1898 HC 2611, VIII, 147. Copy 
reproduced in J Booth, Stand and Deliver, 
Waterside Press (1998), Appendix A. 3 
and discussed by the writer in The 
Statutory Position of the Revenue Department 
((1999) 6 EFSL). The Treasury minute is 
also significant in that it is often 
inaccurately quoted in Treasury and 
Revenue memorandums, but it does 
contain whatever alleged authority exists 
for the Revenue to remit tax on the 
following grounds:
(a) fixed principles affecting classes, 
and
(b) on grounds of equity or compassion. 
(emphasis added)
In 1958 this minute was regarded by 
the Treasury as ''still the basis Jor our policy'. 
(PRO T233/1598. HF 93/826/01, 11 
June 1958), although the Revenue 
altered the grounds for remissions to 
'poverty or other grounds' (1936), 
'comparative hardship' (1970) and 'to 
meet cases of hardship', (IR 1, 1999). 
HM Customs and Excise did explain to 
the CPA, in 1966, their own continued 
use of 'grounds of compassion', to be 
without problems, from a quoted case 
(1966-67 HC 647-1, VIII, 687, 
q. 2590).
However in 1950 the ambiguities, for 
the Financial Secretary, were clear when 
he advised the Chancellor that:
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'The doctrine of'ESCs', or, less politely, 
deviating from the law ... always seems to me 
to be odd. But if we do it, I see no reason jbr 
concealing it.' (PRO T233/1097, memo 
30 October 1950)
These ambiguities were endorsed, for 
the same CPA meeting, in a memo to Sir 
W Eady, who was advised that:
'Our dispensing power ...is one of the 
great mysteries of the British Constitution'. 
(PRO T2 3 3/15 94)
However it was noted in the same 
Treasury review that the Revenue made 
concessions 'off their own bat'.
A continuing ambiguity is that 
references to the Treasury imply a single 
statutory authority, although Halsbury's 
Laws are clear that 'The Treasury' means:
'The Lord High Treasurer for the time 
being, or the Commissioners for the time 
being of Her Majesty's Treasury'. (Vol. 8 
(1974) para. 1165)
CONCESSIONS ANOMALY
This article is a review of the anomaly 
of remissions of tax (called 
'concessions'), made on the authority7 
of the Commissioners of HM Treasury, 
and shows, from the most recently 
released papers in the Public Record 
Office, that this is widely 
misunderstood within the Treasury and 
Inland Revenue.
These commissioners are the First 
Lord of the Treasury (the Prime 
Minister) and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer; they do not include the 
Junior Lords of the Treasury, although all 
form a Treasury Board, which does not 
meet. There is, however, much 
correspondence which does not separate 
the two offices, but the subject did arise 
in 1959 in regard to the Chancellor'so
powers (over the Revenue), in a note by 
the Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue, which concluded that:
'The Chancellor is responsible for revenue 
policy while the two revenue departments act 
as [a] "managerial arm " — the Inland 
Revenue being subject to Treasury 
"direction ".'
The following manuscript note was 
added:
'This note uses the term 'Chancellor' and 
'Treasury' as separate things. If it implies
that Treasury officials are responsible for 
taxation policy ...we could not agree. [The] 
Treasury in a statute means the Lords 
Commissioners — not their advisers in 
Whitehall.' (PRO IR 40/13386, PS 2590 
23 February 1959)
This view conforms with Halsbury's 
Laws and places any decisions, in regard 
to remissions, firmly with the First Lord 
and the Chancellor. However the need 
to secure the approval of Parliament is 
still paramount, as Terry Davies MP 
called for in a Budget debate, which 
failed on a party line vote (63 HC Deb 
6s 1983-84, cols. 1162-66).
A continuing problem is that the 
commissioners and junior lords are 
transient political appointees and are 
briefed bv Treasury officials, who are 
themselves uncertain as to the statutory 
authority. This was demonstrated when a 
Chancellor asked:
'What is the authority for extra-statutory 
concessions? Customs tell me that this is a 
question for the Treasury. ' (PRO 
T233/1592, 25 February 1938)
However, this could be overcome by 
appointing senior officials to be 
commissioners on the Treasury Board, 
in order to provide a continuum of 
statutory knowledge, and if the Board 
were to meet and report proposed 
remissions to Parliament for approval.
MINUTES: AN AUTHORITY 
OR DECEPTION?
Although the statutory authority for 
HM Treasury to authorise minutes, in 
regard to remissions, is ambiguous, the 
CPA has regularly identified that the 
origin stems from the Treasury. But is 
this correct? In 1982 it was stated to be:
'First expressed by the Treasury in 1897 
[that] extra-statutory class concessions 
should be placed on a statutory footing at the 
earliest opportunity.' (1981-82 HC 339, 
para. 32)
This was endorsed by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General (the 'C & AG'), 
who confirmed the arrangement that:
'In 1897 the Inland Revenue Department 
are requested to furnish annually [to the C 
& AG] schedules ojthe amounts remitted ... 
so that he may report to Parliament any 
questionable use oj the Board's dispensing 
power'. (1981-82 HC 76-IX, XV, paras. 
56-59)
This, of course, only provided for 
Parliamentary approval after the event 
rather than for debate on a proposal 
beforehand, as Davies sought. But the 
authority stated is the Treasury Minute 
of 31 December 1897, and should be 
qualified because it was in response to 
the illegal waiving of duty due on the
o o J
estate of the late Alexander III in 1894. 
The waiving of this estate duty was not, 
as has been claimed, the first extra- 
statutory concession. Indeed the CPA 
rebuked the Treasury over the 
unrecorded waiver, claiming that it was 
'not only 'extra-statutory' but actually 
against the law', to which the Treasury 
responded that the 'dispensing power 
exercised is not in all respects satisfactory' 
(1897 HC 196 (166), VIII, 5, Second 
Report, para. 17, and 1898 HC 261, 
VIII, 1, 148).
A fresh criterion was therefore 
established lor dispensations, although 
the Treasury had been rebuked earlier 
for issuing dispensing minutes. In 1885, 
for instance, when the* Treasury made 
allowances to the Commissioners of 
Income Tax (Minute, 3 November 
1885), they were told by the CPA that:
'They are extra-statutory ... [and] they 
should be legalised by statutory authority'. 
(1884-85 HC 267, VII, 37)
This was done in the Taxes Act 1891, s. 
2. But again, in 1887, the CPA told the 
Treasury, in regard to superannuation 
allowances, that:
'It is Parliament and not the Treasury 
which ought to decide ... [on] straining the 
law to meet exigencies ... the Treasury is 
usurping the functions of the Legislators.' 
HC 201, VII, l,para. 48)
The Treasury responded by including 
the provision in the Statute Law Revision 
Act 1887, s.4. Despite this, the 
Parliamentary challenges continued, 
and in 1891 the Treasury responded 
that 'They [i.e. the First Lord and the 
Chancellor] do not claim to have the 
power of remitting', following which 
the exemptions were withdrawn (1894 
HC 249, IX, 321, T.M. 15 December 
1894).
Finally, on 24 March 1897, in giving 
evidence to the PCA, Sir EW Hamilton, 
the then Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, referred to the fact that the 
Treasury had no power of remitting the 
duty:
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'The Treasury do not contend they have any 
power to remit taxation'. (1897 HC 314, 
VIII, 125, q. 393)
SINGLE AUTHORITY?
A continuing ambiguity is that 
references to the Treasury imply a 
single statutory authority, although 
Hahbury's Laws are clear that 'The 
Treasury' means:
'The Lord High TreasurerJbr the time 
being, or the Commissioners Jbr the time 
being of Her Majesty's Treasury'. (Vol. 8 
(1974) para. 1165)
These commissioners are the First 
Lord of the Treasury (the Prime 
Minister) and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer; they do not include the 
Junior Lords of the Treasury, although 
all form a Treasury Board, which does 
not meet.
These admissions appear to show diat 
neither HM Treasury nor the 
Departmental Treasury have had 
(historically) statutory authority to remit 
taxes. So on what authority did the Minute 
of 1897 emerge, for which authority is 
claimed by successive CPA's? The Exchequer 
and Audit Department Act 1866 had 
continued the use of Royal Orders, which 
required Treasury minutes dispensing with 
an audit to be laid before Parliament and 
therefore those minutes had 
Parliamentary authority (PROT 29/606 at 
p. 620). Although the laying of minutes 
before Parliament was not continued, it is 
suggested that the Treasury Department 
regarded the 1866 Act (s. 14, 44) as an 
enabling measure to be filled in by Treasury 
minutes. However the 1866 Act did 
provide that, in regard to expenses for 
public service to be countersigned by the 
Lords Commissioners, the Treasury could 
dispense with the examination of certain 
accounts by the C & AG. Therefore, in 
regard to any historic precedents not 
tested in the courts, the present use of 
Treasury minutes to authorise remissions 
is suggested to be an assertion by the 
Treasury, to which the Lords 
Commissioners (without advice) and 
Parliament have acquiesced, and not a 
statutory authority.
Later, in 1979, concern over 
unauthorised remissions caused David 
Williams to conclude that:
'Most of the extra-statutory concessions are 
illegal. That ... [they] grow regularly ...
cannot but reflect on the quality of the 
executive that creates them and the polity that 
tolerates them'. ([1979] BTR, 137)
(It is interesting to note that 50 were 
published in 1950 and 294 in 1999).
David Williams' article was 
commended by Lord Edmund Davies 
([1980] STC 10 at p. 35e, note 4).
The views of ministers, learned 
counsel and commentators on this 
anomaly can now be considered.
MINISTERS' EXPLANATIONS
These are unconvincing, reflecting 
Treasury briefs from authorities claimed 
to be 'unknown'. In 1944, in replying to 
Cdr Galbraith Mr} the Chancellor stated 
concessions to be 'granted in virtue of the 
existence of a somewhat indefinite 
dispensing power' (emphasis added) and 
that they were given 'in wartime not in 
peacetime' (400 HC Deb 5s. 1943-44, 
cols. 2 173 76). The latter statement was 
untrue, as a building-society-arranged 
concession had existed before 1887. In 
1949 another Chancellor tried to explain 
a different legal basis as 'without any 
particular legal authority, but by the Inland 
Revenue under my authority' (466 HC 
Deb 5s. 1948-49, col. 2267) (emphasis 
added).
Another interpretation was given in 
1976 by a minister of state, who said: 
'Extra-statutory concessions ... (are) 
obviously always in favour of the taxpayer 
(emphasis added) (915 HC Deb 5s. 
1975-76, col. 187).
This was also untrue, as shown by the 
building society concession, and later by 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, Case No C.389/90 (see 
Stand and Deliver! op. cit. at p. 202). But 
in 1984 the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury gave another explanation for 
remissions, stating that:
'Both the Inland Revenue and Customs and 
Excise are charged statutorily with care and 
administration, and from that statutory power 
their authority ... is thought to derive.' 
(emphasis added) (63 HC Deb 6s. 
1983-84, cols. 1162-1175)
The problem was that neither 
ministers nor the Treasury knew the 
authority or that it did not exist. The 
Revenue confused matters further by 
issuing a press release in 1987 to the 
effect that remissions were:
'A relaxation which gives to taxpayers a 
reduction in tax liability to which they are not 
entitled in law'. (Press release, 25 
September 1987, and included in 
subsequent IR 1 booklets on 
concessions)
All of these explanations were made 
from briefs by the departmental Treasury 
when the legal authority was admitted to 
be unknown (PRO T2 3 3/15 94). The 
amending clause, sought by Terry Davies, 
MP, in 1984, was therefore an important 
constitutional compromise in that Davies 
said:
'The point is not that the concessions may 
be wrong ... but^that they should be given 
with the authority of the House of Commons'. 
(op. cit. 63 HC Deb 6s 1983-84)
What did others make of this 
controversy?
JUDGMENTS, LEARNED 
COUNSEL & COMMENTATORS
This section considers the courts' 
views on the statutory liability to tax, the 
position of concessions and the Revenue 
in relation to such concessions. It is of 
some concern that during the period 
from before 1887 until 1991, the 
Revenue had made arrangements and 
concessions with building societies for 
their mutual administrative convenience 
and admitted this to be the case. This 
distorted the statutory charging to tax of 
interest paid, to the disadvantage of all 
those savers with no tax liability, until it 
was stated to be illegal by the then Nolan 
J ([1987] STC 654 at p. 657) and 
discussed by the writer in 1998, 5 EFSL. 
This confirmed that the concessions 
were not restricted to wartime, nor were 
they necessarily in favour of taxpayers.
APPEALS
The prospects in regard to taxpayers 
seeking appeals against the Revenue's 
subsidiary legislation are grim.
Lord Cairns said as early as 1869:
'If the person sought to be taxed comes 
within the letter of the law he must be taxed'. 
((1869) LR4HL 100)
To this Earl Loreburn added in 1915, 
where the letter of the law had been 
disregarded, that 'It can be done only in 
cases of necessity' ([1915] AC 1011). 25
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These examples show that, from 1887, 
the Revenue had neither observed the law 
nor shown that their actions were 
necessary and continued to make secret 
arrangements, which remained 
unpublished until 1950. However in 1944 
wartime concessions were published 
(Cmd 6559) and claimed to be 'in the 
administration of Revenue duties'. It was 
of course nothing of the sort and, with the 
omission of the pre-1939 remissions, led 
to the misleading impression that they 
were made on the sole authority of the 
Revenue and only in wartime. Yet Lord 
Scott had stated in 1944:
'No jurisdiction can, or ought to be given 
in matters of taxation to any system oj extra- 
legal concessions'. ([1944] CA 1011)
Viscount Radcliffe LJ later commented 
scathingly, in 1964, that:
7 have never understood the procedures of 
extra-stautory concessions in the case of a body to 
whom at least the door of Parliament is opened 
every year for adjustments of the tax code'. 
([1965] AC 402)
In 1966 Lord Upjohn had no time for 
the Revenue and illustrated the extension 
of the Revenue's policy of 'convenience', 
stating that:
'Realising the monstrous result of giving effect 
to the section [ITA 1952, s. 408 (2)] they 
have worked out what they consider to be an 
equitable way of operating it. I am quite unable 
to understand upon what principle they can 
properly do so'. ([1968] AC 483)
Later, Walton J in 1978 was both 
scathing and perplexed about the Revenue:
7 am totally unable to understand on what 
basis the Revenue are entitled to make extra- 
statutory concessions ... and why are some 
groups favoured as against others? [If] the 
Crown can remit ...at its own sweet will and 
pleasure ...we are back to the days of the Star 
Chamber ... The root of the evil is that it 
claims it has, in fact, the right to do so'. 
(STC 567 at p. 575)
This judgment also raised the question 
of the Revenue's entitlement to make 
concessions and carried a per curiam:
'Extra-statutory concessions would appear to 
be unconstitutional in as much as the Crown is 
claiming the power to dispense with the laws'.
But in 1979 Lord Wilberforce 
returned to the question and was clear 
that 'One should be taxed by law, and not 
untaxed by concession [which] lacks any legal
basis'. To this Lord Edmund Davies added:
'Despite the reliance placed on the FMA 
1 970 and the IRRA 1890 the fact is there 
exists no statutory support for the assessment 
procedure adopted in the present case'.
However, in 1987, some of the 
Revenue's powers were deemed to have 
been extended under the 'care and 
management' provisions of the Taxes 
Management Act 1970 when, in a judicial 
review, it was held by McNeill J that:
'The extra-statutory concessions offered by 
the Revenue were lawful and were within the 
proper exercise of managerial discretion'. 
([1987] STC 344)
One conclusion is obvious in that, 
because the original authority still rests 
with that given by HM Treasury, under 
the minute of 1897, and being subsidiary 
legislation if at all, an appeal has only 
been possible under a judicial review; 
thus the Revenue's 'managerialo
discretion' was based on an authority 
passed to the Revenue by the Treasury 
minute. It is therefore unhelpful that in 
another edition of Halsbury's Laws it is 
stated that:
'Such concessions are now accepted as being 
within the proper exercise cf managerial 
discretion'. (Vol. 23, 4th ed. (1991), para. 
31, at 32)
They are so accepted if Parliamentary- 
sources, and the significance of 
subsidiary legislation impinging upon the 
Statutes, are ignored.
SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION 
& SOME CONSEQUENCES
The contribution by the then Sir John 
Donaldson MR, in a 1984 judical review 
case, has been decisive in underlining the 
problems created through secondary 
legislation for the Revenue and its
o
taxpayers, unaccessible to the courts, and 
ignored by the Treasury and Revenue 
alike. Sir John made clear that:
'The UK has no written constitution, it is 
a convention oj the highest importance that 
the legislature and judicature are separate and 
independent oj one another'.
Turning to subordinate legislation he 
then said:
'It is the function of Parliament to legislate 
and legislation is necessarily in written form. 
It is the function of the courts to construe and 
interpret that legislation. It is for Parliament
to make the laws and for the courts to tell the 
nation, including members of both Houses of 
Parliament, what those laws mean.'
'Legislation by Order in Council, Statutory 
Instrument or other subordinate means is in a 
quite different category, not being 
Parliamentary legislation.'
Sir John also added, without apparent 
reference to the 1897 Minute, that:
NO LEGAL FORCE
...although the Revenue has contributed 
to blurring the parameters of their 
statutory authority, in regard to 
subsidiary legislation, and remissions in 
particular, their authority to remit, if at 
all, originates in the Treasury and 
Treasury minutes, which have not been 
challenged despite being without 'legal 
force or effect'.
'This subordinate legislation is subject to 
some degree of judicial control in the sense that 
it is within the province and authority of the 
courts to hold that particular examples are not 
authorised by statute, or as the case may be the 
common law, and so are without legal force or 
effect'. ([1984] 1 All ER 589 at p. 593)
The case in regard to the 1897 Minute 
therefore seems conclusive in that it has 
never come before the province and 
authority of the courts and must be 
without legal force or effect. Nevertheless 
concessions have been upheld by the CPA 
to have their origin in that minute, on 
which authority the Departmental 
Treasury and Revenue have continued to 
act. But in a judicial review case in 1982, 
in the judgments of Lords Diplock and 
Scarman the Revenue's position was 
outlined as being 'charged by statute with 
the care, management and collection' of 
inland revenues (TMA 1970, s. 1(1)). 
Exercising this function, it was claimed 
that the Revenue have:
'a wide managerial discretion as to the best 
means of obtaining ... the highest net return 
that is possible'.
But it was stated that 'there is no 
difference between the exercise of a 
managerial and administrative discretion' 
([1982] AC 617).
The conundrum remains of the ending 
of dispensing power by the 1688 Bill of 
Rights, the remitting authority of the 
1897 minute, and the 'authority,
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direction and control' of the Revenue by 
the Treasury. There is also the long- 
standing administrative authority of 
Professor HWR Wade that:
'Public authorities should be compellable to 
perform their duties, as a matter of public 
interest, at the instance oj any person 
genuinely concerned'. (Administrative Law, 
6th ed., Oxford (1977), at p. 608)
Also in 1987 Professor Ganz noted 
that: 'Quasi-legal or non-legal rules ... 
may be nothing more than a sop to 
pressure groups'. (G Ganz, Quasi- 
Legislation, Sweet & Maxwell, (1987) at 
p. 105). The writer confirmed this to be 
the case regarding National Savings in 
Stand and Deliver!, op. cit. at p. 173.
In 1991 W Hinds also questioned the 
legality of Revenue concessions through 
the use of estoppel, (Estopping the Taxman, 
[1991] BTR at p. 191). This would 
include the Revenue's subsidiary 
legislation, also as statements of advice 
rulings and agreements, extra-statutory 
concessions and statements of practice. 
These:
'Could not be given legally binding Jorce 
through the argument that reliance induced by 
official statements should estop the Revenue 
from acting in an inconsistent manner'.
Hinds also drew attention to Rowlatt J, 
who in 1924 had ruled that:
'The CIR had no power to bind the Crown 
by a general declaration of what the law is in 
particular circumstances beforehand'. (Liberty 
S^Co Ltd v CIR, not reported, (1924) 12 
TC at p. 639)
Hinds also noted that:
'[The] cornerstone of administrative law is 
the 'ultra vires' doctrine; an authority must 
show legal authority for its acts and if it acted 
beyond the limits of the powers its acts were 
legally ineffective'.
There were also shown to be other 
cornerstones of case law into which 
published concessions could not be made 
to fit, such as the statement that:
'[The] Income Tax was a tax imposed 
annually by Parliament and it would be wholly 
beyond the powers of the Revenue to make an 
agreement as to the collection in future years'.
and
'The Revenue could not agree in advance as 
to which basis was to be employed as this was 
a matter which must be determined annually 
[by Parliament].' ([1916] 1 Ch. 228)
It is now possible to consider the 
question of appeals.
APPEALS! WHAT APPEALS?
The question of redressing a taxpayer's 
grievance in regard to subsidiary 
legislation has had insufficient analysis, 
although Sir John Donaldson made it 
quite clear that subsidiary legislation is 
not Parliamentary legislation, and is 
without 'legal force or effect'. However
O
remissions did exist, although W 
Armstrong wrote a Treasury paper in 
1958 in which he considered that:
'It would be extremely dangerous and 
contrary to democratic principles (by giving to 
the executive) general discretion to dispense 
with the law'. (PRO T233/1 598, 18 June 
1958, para. 2)
If this is so, and with the inconsistent 
court rulings, how are appeals to be 
brought against the Revenue' remissions? 
The Revenue are of no help, stating in a 
paper on their 'Powers and Procedures' 
that the only consideration in regard to 
appeals was in the context of 'facts or the 
law', which was ignored in their
' O
comments on remissions (PRO 
T233/1598, 16 October 1956).
As it has been shown that 
arrangements and tax concessions have 
existed since 1887, it is surprising that no 
view at all existed in the Treasury or the 
Revenue in regard to appeals against 
subsidiary legislation. In 1980 J Alder 
showed that the avenue of a judicial 
review faced problems of locus standi or 
who can challenge the legality of aO O J
concession? Alder's view was that:
'A person who falls within a published 
concession can insist on it being applied to 
him [sic] by means of an application for a 
declaration since his liability to pay tax is 
directly affected'. ([ 1980] NLJ 1 8 1)
But the difficulties are compounded, 
as judgments showed. For example, the 
then Lord Denning MR considered in 
1980 that 'The applicant must have 
sufficient interest in the matter' ([1980] 
STC 261 at p. 273) and quoted the 
Attorney-General of the Gambia in 1961 
that it should be a person with a genuine 
grievance:
'Because something has been done or 
omitted to be done contrary to what the law 
requires'. ([1961] AC 617 at p.634)
Lord Denning extended his argument 
further, supposing that:
'[If] a government department ... is 
transgressing the law ... which offends or 
injures thousands ofHM's subjects, then 
anyone cf those offended ... can draw it to the 
attention of the Courts of law and seek to 
have the law enforced'.
Also, in regard to an amnesty to tax, as 
an unlawful agreement with the Revenue, 
Lord Denning noted that:
'Counselfor the Crown invited us to proceed 
on the assumption that the Revenue acted 
unlawfully because they had no dispensing 
power', (op. cit. at p. 275)
From this standpoint, reference was 
drawn to Lord Denning's concept of 
'legitimate expectations' ([1969] 2 Ch 
149 at p. 170), and in 1980 to Lord 
Bingham LI, noting 'the valuableO J ' O
developing doctrine of legitimate 
expectations' ([1990] 1 All ER 91 at p. 
110). Hinds also noted that legitimate 
expectations had created something like:
' A public law right, which the courts will 
protect by judicial review', (op. cit. at p. 198)
But although estoppel has been 
undermined by the principles of fairness 
and legitimate expectations, (in 1991) 
the taxpayer had not succeeded in any of 
the cases discussed. Also, in 1999, the 
Revenue stated, of the subsidiary 
employment regulations, that:
'The only way in which a taxpayer can 
properly contest directions under (employment) 
regulations ... is by way ojjudicial review'. 
([1999] STC 550 CA)
AMBIGUOUS AUTHORITY
Although the statutory authority for 
HM Treasury to authorise minutes, in 
regard to remissions, is ambiguous, the 
CPA has regularly identified that the 
origin stems from the Treasury. But is 
this correct?
Fortunately the Court of Appeal 
rejected the Revenue's advice and 
criticised them for not providing a right 
of appeal against (subsidiary) regulations; 
a re-hearing was allowed, without leaveO '
for the Revenue to appeal   a decision 
discussed by the writer in the Tax 
Practioner, November 1999.
The consequences for aggrieved 
taxpayers seeking to use a judicial review 
were illustrated by R Bartlett in 1987. He 
pointed out that the cost of a case going 27
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to the House of Lords at that time was 
some £50,000 and that taxpayers had 
succeeded in only five out of 26 cases 
since 1973 ([1981] BTR at p. 10). The 
prospects in regard to taxpayers seeking 
appeals against the Revenue's subsidiary 
legislation are grim.
CONCLUSIONS
The thrust of this article has been to show 
that, although the Revenue has contributed 
to blurring the parameters of their statutory 
authority, in regard to subsidiary legislation, 
and remissions in particular, their authority 
to remit, if at all, originates in the Treasury 
and Treasury minutes, which have not been 
challenged despite being without 'legal force
or effect'. The Revenue, acting upon their 
authority of 'care and management', have 
obfuscated the authority for remissions as 
'concessions', which reflects poorly on all 
parties. Perhaps the courts should be 
empowered to consider subsidiary Revenue 
legislation when determining the 
consequences of, and explaining to all, what 
the statutes mean? With 111 employment 
regulations, 294 concessions, and 304 
statements of practice in 2000, that would 
be no mean task.
Finally, in view of the court costs of 
taxpayers' appeals, and because the 
Revenue uses the Exchequer's funds to 
defend and prosecute its own cases, the 
taxpayer, as appellant or defendant,
should have equal access to this funding. 
Such a measure would create a new, more 
democratic, and more level playing 
field. ©
Dr John Booth
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